Here’s a good example of writing (by Robert Lanza, M.D.) that combines pseudo-science with pseudo-philosophy (metaphysical speculations that, when put together in several paragraphs, form a long chain of near non sequiturs)-
One well-known aspect of quantum physics is that certain observations cannot be predicted absolutely. Instead, there is a range of possible observations each with a different probability. One mainstream explanation, the “many-worlds” interpretation, states that each of these possible observations corresponds to a different universe (the ‘multiverse’). A new scientific theory – called biocentrism – refines these ideas.
[Editorial comment: we learn at the end of this article that "biocentrism" was invented by Lanza, who, according to his (auto?)biographical note, "is considered one of the leading scientists in the world".]
There are an infinite number of universes, and everything that could possibly happen occurs in some universe. Death does not exist in any real sense in these scenarios. All possible universes exist simultaneously, regardless of what happens in any of them. Although individual bodies are destined to self-destruct, the alive feeling – the ‘Who am I?’- is just a 20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain. But this energy doesn’t go away at death. One of the surest axioms of science is that energy never dies; it can neither be created nor destroyed. But does this energy transcend from one world to the other?
It goes on like this for a while (actually, it gets far worse). You can read it all here.
Kripke would be turning in his grave, if he were in his grave. Saul Kripke is, among other things, an inventor of “modal logic”, the logic of possibility and necessity. Such logic deals with counterfactual sentences like the first one of this paragraph. Translated into Kripke-speak (and putting aside the thorny issue of how to interpret metaphors), that sentence would be stating: “There is a possible world in which Kripke is turning in his grave”. And, on Kripke’s view, there is such a possible world just in case it is conceivable. Of course, there’s a lot of philosophical debate about which worlds are really conceivable or not, and on the question of whether conceivability is really the right test of a modal statement’s truth. But, unfortunately, some otherwise level-headed philosophers – such as David Lewis – have run with this semantic ball all the way to speculative-metaphysics-land, arguing that if modal statements make sense at all (and they do), then all possible worlds must exist just like the actual world exists (including physically)… consistent with the sort of multiverse theory Lanza is apparently imagining.
Now, not every multiverse physical theory needs to presuppose Lewis-style possible world semantics. Indeed, one which merely presupposes, as Lanza puts it, that “each of these possible observations correspond to a different universe” need not do so, as long as “different universe” can be interpreted merely as a possible world in Kripke’s sense of the expression. But notice that Lanza slides from this metaphysically ambiguous assertion to the further view that “There are an infinite number of universes, and everything that could possibly happen occurs in some universe.” This, along with other remarks in Lanza’s article, reeks of modal realism (that is, Lewis-style modal semantics, as opposed to Kripke-style). Now, I have no a priori proof that a multiverse theory that presupposes modal realism is false. But, if such a theory is supposed to be scientific, it has to be confirmable or disconfirmable. And while a purely physical multiverse theory – one which doesn’t presuppose modal realism – might be confirmed empirically, by the observations it helps to predict and explain, no metaphysical view can be confirmed or disconfirmed in this way. The Kripke/Lewis debate ultimately boils down to differing linguistic or conceptual “intuitions”. So when writers like Lanza combine multiverse theory, modal realism, and the downright silly reduction of personal identity (or self-consciousness) to the “20-watt fountain of energy operating in the brain” that is conserved after death, and implies that it is a scientific theory, I have to protest. In the last forty or so years, more silly pop-metaphysics has been produced by speculations based on quantum physics (and the uncertainty principle) than by anything else. And this is a prime example.
Note: this post was re-written in response to a comment made by Marshall Missner (see the comments section).
